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aim was to secure subsidies from the Mauritian government to reduce the price of airfares to 
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negative image of a Creole minority suppressed by a Hindu majority to strategic use to achieve 
a stronger recognition of Rodriguan interests within the Republic of Mauritius. 
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Introduction 
 
The 2008 financial crisis has had a strong impact all over the world; many consider it to be the 
most significant financial meltdown since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Small island 
states and territories dependent on tourism were particularly affected by its related significant 
decline in consumer wealth. With less money to spend, there were less people who could 
afford a holiday in remote destinations. Consequently, there were fewer tourists who travelled 
there. Mauritius is a particular case in point where tourism, together with the sugarcane and 
textile industries, is traditionally considered the third pillar of the economy (Aladin, 1993; 
Bunwaree, 2001; Dommen & Dommen, 1999; Lincoln, 2006). 
 
This article centres on an organization formed by tourism entrepreneurs from the small island 
of Rodrigues, a subnational island jurisdiction and a dependency of the Republic of Mauritius, 
called Associations du Tourisme Réunies (ATR). In order to tackle the problems triggered by 
the significant drop in visitor numbers due to the 2008 global financial crisis, ATR sought to 
secure  subsidized  airfares  to  attract  more  tourists  to  their  island.  I  accompanied  their 
representatives during their negotiation process with the Mauritian government. The analysis 
shows how the group made creative use of ethnic difference to achieve goals that went beyond 
mere financial support; namely a stronger recognition of Creole/Rodriguan interests and ethnic 
diversity within Mauritian society as a whole. For this, economic misfits and ethnic conflict 
between Mauritius and its small island dependency Rodrigues, in particular those affecting C. Wergin 
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people’s mobilities, are analysed ethnographically (Tsing, 2000; Lash & Urry, 1994; Neveling 
& Wergin, 2009; Wynne, 2005). 
 
The article discusses events on Rodrigues, using the ATR initiative to present the regional-to-
global  interconnections  of  the  island  set  out  in  the  realms  of  tourism  development  and 
challenges faced by the 2008 global financial crisis. This includes the assessment of the wider 
interests of the ATR members as part of a well-educated Société Civil. Particular attention will 
be  paid  to  the  historical  specificity  of  events  surrounding  the  negotiations  of  Rodriguan 
tourism entrepreneurs with the Mauritian government, as well as to the alliances they formed 
to achieve their goals. This will construct a larger picture of current Rodriguan socio-cultural 
politics as a regional process with “open-ended indeterminacy” (Tsing, 2000: 349). But, before 
that, a historical overview of Rodrigues that includes its past and current political and socio-
cultural situation. 
 
Overview 
 
In 1528, the Portuguese sailor Diego Rodriguez discovered an island that was to bear his name: 
109km
2 of volcanic land, almost entirely surrounded by a 90km
2 coral reef that has created a 
lagoon twice the size of the island. Its highest point is Mont Limon with an elevation of about 
355m.  Rodrigues  is  a  hybrid  cultural  space.  It  was  uninhabited  before  colonization.  The 
island’s contemporary population is based on migration, deportation, exile, and slavery. The 
majority  speaks  a  distinct  Creole.  English  and  French  are  mainly  used  in  administrative 
contexts and in school. Today, about 35,000 people live on the island. As many Rodriguans 
live on Mauritius, and about 10,000 have migrated to Australia. 
 
Key challenges for the people living on Rodrigues include a lack of industrial development 
and, related to this, a high unemployment rate. The small island caters to tourism imaginaries 
of  a  place  ‘frozen  in  time’  and  ‘unspoiled  by  development’.  Reasons  for  this  are  (1)  its 
geographical  isolation  about  560km  east  of  Mauritius;  and  (2)  the  cultural  and  economic 
neglect  of  its  Creole  population  by  a  Hindu-dominated  ‘mother(is)land’.  Creoles  are 
traditionally considered under-represented within the Republic of Mauritius (Eriksen, 1998; 
Selvon, 2005). Politically, a Hindu majority dominates Mauritius, while the Franco-Mauritian 
minority owns most of the land (Eisenlohr, 2006; Mukonoweshuro, 1991). In the 1982 census, 
the term Creole was used to describe all those Mauritians who are descendants of African 
slaves. In the Republic of Mauritius, the Indo-Mauritians constitute 68% of the total population 
(and 52% of Mauritians are Hindu); Creoles account for about 27% of the population. In sharp 
contrast, Creoles make up around 97% of the residents of Rodrigues; and the same proportion 
upholds the Catholic faith there. These are two significant differences to the population of 
multiethnic  Mauritius  that  have  resulted  in  longstanding  ethnic  conflicts  and  a  continued 
Malaise Créole (Boswell, 2006; Greig et al., 2011; Carroll & Carroll, 2000a). 
 
Poverty, especially within the Creole minority, threatens Mauritian social cohesion (Bunwaree 
& Kasenally, 2007). The possibility of uprisings against the state authorities that might result 
from this was first highlighted by riots in 1999, after the death of the island’s most popular 
Creole  Seggae  singer  Kaya.  Those  presented  the  strongest  case  of  civic  violence  since 
Mauritian independence (Laville, 2000). Compared to similar events  elsewhere, these riots     Trumping the Ethnic Card in Rodrigues 
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may appear of minor significance; yet, Mauritian authorities began to realize how fragile their 
peaceful ‘rainbow nation’ actually was (Carroll & Carroll, 2000a; Miles, 1999; Bunwaree, 
2002).  This  is  especially  critical  for  Mauritius  as  a  tourist  destination,  where  “Trouble  in 
Paradise” would damage the island’s widely touted reputation as a stable society and polity 
(Carroll & Carroll, 2000b; AfDB-OECD, 2008). Yet, while social democracy and the welfare 
state  remain  part  of  Mauritius’  political  philosophy  (Kasenally,  2011;  Khoodabux,  2000; 
Bräutigam, 1997), inequalities and the economic effects of globalization continue to undermine 
the official discourse of a peaceful multiethnic society (Greig et al., 2011). 
 
The ethnic conflict between Hindus and Creoles within the Republic of Mauritius becomes 
even more apparent in the case of Rodrigues. The great majority of Rodriguans see themselves 
in a disadvantaged position within the Republic of Mauritius because of their Creole descent, 
especially when it comes to important political decisions. Rodrigues has had limited access to 
decision-making  processes.  First  under  British  rule,  it  was  of  no  particular  strategic  or 
economic  relevance  to  the  colonizer.  After  Mauritian  independence  in  1968,  its  political 
dependency on Mauritius set it further apart, as efforts made by the political authorities for 
socio-economic  improvement  focused  almost  exclusively  on  the  ‘mother(is)land’.  In  both 
cases, this is partly due to the fact that Rodrigues is located in a remote location. The nearest 
international  airport  is  on  Mauritius,  which  is  also  the  only  destination  for  flights  from 
Rodrigues.  The  closest  harbour  is  Port  Louis,  also  on  Mauritius,  roughly  a  36-hour  boat 
journey away. Consequently, all tourists (except for individual sailors that travel the Indian 
Ocean on their yachts) need to pass via Mauritius in order to reach the island. 
 
The impact of the economic crisis of 2008 was compounded by the unique characteristics of 
the  island’s  natural  environment  and  the  aforementioned  considerable  isolation  from  other 
countries, as well as ethnic differences that separate it from Mauritius. Apart from diverse 
employment opportunities related to the tourism sector, economic resources on Rodrigues are 
limited  to  fishing,  agriculture  and  day-to-day  businesses.  Main  incomes,  apart  from  social 
benefits  accruing  from  the  Mauritian  authorities,  are  generated  through  public  sector  jobs 
(especially civil service and education). Furthermore, today, there is a wide range of political 
and economic interests at play since Rodrigues received the official status of autonomy within 
the  Republic  of  Mauritius  in  2001.  This  gave  the  island’s  Chief  Commissioner  (CC)  in 
agreement with his local government, the Rodrigues Regional Assembly (RRA), the right to 
spend money from a yearly budget allocated to him by Mauritian authorities. 
 
Today,  Rodriguans  demand  and  depend  on  their  share  of  tourism  income  generated  in 
Mauritius. The following section provides an ethnography of how the economic crisis was 
tackled in a creative way by ATR and how its members put the negative image of a Creole 
minority suppressed by a Hindu majority into strategic use to gain support for their struggling 
tourism sector. This will account for ways in which local ethnic conflict continues to inform 
economics,  politics  and  everyday  practices  in  Mauritius.  In  doing  so,  the  article  adds  a 
‘Rodriguan’ layer to existing observations and argues that debates about ethnicity and political 
discrimination have not lost their importance in Mauritius; rather, their significance to concrete 
historic events where local elites find new ways and means to make use of them in support of 
their interests may need to be reconsidered. 
 C. Wergin 
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The ATR Experience 
 
My seven-month fieldwork on Rodrigues was focused on initiatives for the further develop-
ment  of  the  local  tourism  industry  and  its  significance  for  Rodriguan  culture  and  identity 
politics. I had visited the island before, in 2003. At the time, many of its inhabitants seemed 
enthusiastic about the prospect of turning Rodrigues into a new destination for what at that 
time had been identified as upcoming sustainable and eco-tourism (Williams, 2004). On my 
return,  six  years  later,  I  expected  to  see  some  of  the  fruits  of  this  promising  plan.  I  was 
surprised, however, to note that not much had changed. A new tourism office had opened, and 
also a new hotel, Pointe Vénus. Conversely, another hotel had closed, and another ran out of 
business during my stay. The local tourism industry was obviously suffering from significant 
shortages in guest arrivals (see Table 1). In addition, the only airline assuring the connection 
between Mauritius and Rodrigues, Air Mauritius, had reduced its flights from up to six to two, 
sometimes only one, per day. As such, instead of tourism development triggered through the 
global interest in sustainable tourist destinations and islands ‘unspoiled by development’
1, the 
economic crisis of 2008 had become a serious threat to what until then had been a growing 
tourism sector, which now began to strongly affect the local economy, infrastructure and well 
being of the Rodriguan people as a whole. 
 
Table 1: Tourist Arrivals on Rodrigues: 2004 - 2009 
 
Tourist 
Totals 
Absolute 
Change 
% 
Change 
2004  48,068 
2005  41,442  -6,626  -13.7% 
2006  42,833  1,391  3.3% 
2007  48,497  5,664  13.2% 
2008  41,136  -7,361  -15.2% 
2009  40,350  -786  -1.9% 
 
(Source: RRA-Magazine 2010).
2 
 
As  a  response,  local  tourism  entrepreneurs  and  associations,  from  hotel  owners  to  dive 
instructors,  formed  Associations  du  Tourisme  Réunies  (ATR).  Its  name  was  deliberately 
chosen. The abbreviation ATR made reference to ATR 72, the plane used by Air Mauritius on 
the route between Rodrigues and its ‘mother(is)land’; the very object through which the global 
economic  crisis  materialized  itself  on  Rodrigues.  ATR  was  founded  as  a  reaction  to  the 
Rodriguan  budget  presented  in  early  2009,  which  did  not  (in  the  opinion  of  its  members) 
foresee the appropriate measures to help the Rodriguan tourism industry regain its strength. 
Their initial idea was to convince the Mauritian government to deduct the fuel tax from the 
                                                 
1 Upon googling the term “unspoiled by development”, on 7 February 2012, five out of the first 10 results of an 
estimated 2,840,000 hits used this phrase to advertise tourist destinations. 
2 The significant drop in tourist arrivals between 2004 and 2005 is largely related to the outbreak of Chikungunya 
on Réunion Island, Mauritius and Rodrigues. This is an insect-borne virus transmitted to humans by mosquitoes. 
Tourists were worried that they might be infected with this virus whose symptoms are similar to dengue fever.     Trumping the Ethnic Card in Rodrigues 
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cost of ticket sales for flights to and from Rodrigues. The resulting significant decrease in 
ticket prices was meant to boost the local tourism industry. If Mauritian authorities would not 
accept the necessary changes to the budget proposal that would be asked for by the Rodrigues 
Regional Assembly (RRA), the deputies of the RRA were asked not to accept the proposal 
either. Two further requests for support were sent out by ATR, one to the Prime Minister of 
Mauritius Navin Ramgoolam, the other to the then leader of the opposition party on Rodrigues, 
Organisation Du People Rodriguais (OPR), Serge Clair. 
 
The members of ATR were not satisfied by the response of the Mauritian authorities to their 
request. On offer was a token deduction of the state fuel tax by 150 MUR (about US$6) per 
ticket between Mauritius and Rodrigues, a return trip that cost about 8,000 MUR (US$320) at 
the time. A further request of ATR to meet the Prime Minister personally was not answered. 
Even worse, ATR found that the Mauritian authorities, rather than using their suggestion to 
introduce promotional prices on airfares to help Rodrigues, had implemented a very similar 
scheme  to  increase  tourism  between  Réunion  Island  (a  neighbouring  French  overseas 
department) and Mauritius, leaving Rodrigues even more marginalized. 
 
My first meeting with ATR was after these initial events, on a rainy day in early June 2009. 
The group had invited the public via local newspaper to join them at the Senior Citizen Centre 
of  Mt.  Lubin,  a  village  in  the  heart  of  Rodrigues.  This  was  where  I  met  their  main 
spokesperson for the first time, Aurele André, a charismatic, politically involved Rodriguan, 
who had already begun to use local and national media, newspaper, radio, and the Internet to 
draw attention to the economic situation on the island. On that day, he was forced to leave 
early because of other commitments as president of the Rodrigues Rotary Club. André was 
also the director of the François Leguat Giant Tortoise and Cave Reserve, which had opened in 
2007 to reintroduce around 3,000 turtles to the island, and also to re-grow parts of its endemic 
forest on the reserve’s 18-hectare estate. As such, he was a particularly influential figure on the 
small island, where important decisions for its political, economical and societal development 
lie in the hands of only a few people. 
 
There were about 20 persons at the meeting in Mt. Lubin, mainly entrepreneurs in the tourism 
sector and trade union representatives who discussed how to take their interests further. The 
most important decision that day was to organize a demonstration in the capital of Rodrigues, 
Port Mathurin, within the next couple of weeks to draw more attention to their problems. The 
other spokesperson of the group who I met that day was Maxy André. He was the president of 
the Association des Gites et Table d'Hôte. I visited him a few days later in his house for a 
personal  interview.  During  our  conversation,  he  received  a  phone  call  from  the  Prime 
Minister’s office and was told that Ramgoolam was to declare the upcoming demonstration a 
“non-event”. From his point of view, their appeal should not be directed towards the Mauritian 
government but their Regional Assembly, and in particular its then Chief Commissioner (CC) 
Johnson Roussety. 
 
The demonstration finally took place on 13 June and was a great success. Numerous people 
told  me  that  it  saw  the  largest  crowd  ever  mobilized  on  the  island.  The  first  issue  of  the 
Mauritian magazine Week-End after the demonstrations on Rodrigues showed on its title page 
a large photo of the demonstrators carrying a banner that read, Maurice: To Bizin Konsider C. Wergin 
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Rodrigues (“Mauritius, you have to care for Rodrigues”), and the headline, Rodrigues: Le Cri 
Du  Cœur  (“Rodrigues,  the  cry  from  the  heart”).  Of  course,  the  organizers  of  ATR  were 
satisfied. They met afterwards in the restaurant Chez Ram, whose owner invited everybody for 
dinner and drinks. This time, it was a smaller group that participated, made up of the same 
people that a few weeks later would travel to Mauritius for negotiations. During dinner, some 
were  called  on  their  mobile  phones  by  different  radio  stations  to  give  interviews.  Sitting 
together allowed them to coordinate their responses, which also gave a more sophisticated and 
unified appearance to ATR. 
 
On 22 June, ATR met with the CC. He made it explicit that the crisis on Rodrigues was 
connected to their conflict-ridden relationship with Mauritius. Roussety’s argument was that 
the financial constraints that were put on the Rodriguan budget prior to its application made it 
impossible to ask for additional funds, even in a time of crisis. He pointed out that the problem 
was more fundamental than the price of airfares; but rather that the Mauritian government did 
not  respect  the  autonomy  of  Rodrigues.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  a  ticket  to  Mumbai, 
Chennai,  or  Bangalore  in  India  was  at  15,000  MUR  (US$600),  and  a  ticket  to  nearby 
Rodrigues cost 8,000 MUR (US$320), was simply not justifiable. Meanwhile, Serge Clair, the 
then opposition leader, had decided to meet with Prime Minister Ramgoolam in Mauritius. 
This meeting was expected to have some positive impact; but it might also have given the 
Mauritian Prime Minister an opportunity to play Clair and Roussety against each other. When 
both fight over Rodrigues, Ramgoolam may have seen himself in a ‘divide and rule’ situation.  
 
What seemed a business lobby in support of the local tourism industry, whose members were 
significant personalities within the social elite on Rodrigues, had by now turned into a broad 
political movement. ATR was partly made up of entrepreneurs who had supported Roussety 
and his promise of political change in the 2006 regional elections,  after 25  years of OPR 
leadership. This support was now slowly fading. Similar changes were visible in regard to 
supporters of the OPR. Roussety’s then party, the Mouvement Rodriguais (MR), interpreted the 
critical position that the OPR took towards what the Société Civil in the form of ATR could 
achieve as opposition to the movement. Even Rommel Farla, the union representative within 
ATR who was traditionally with the OPR, admitted that Clair’s reputation had suffered from 
his apparent disinterest in their efforts. 
 
Clair’s plan was to wait until the CC had put himself into a dead-end situation, without further 
room to negotiate with the Mauritian authorities. Roussety had taken Mauritian authorities to 
the  Supreme  Court  on  the  grounds  that  the  autonomy status  was  breached  because  of  the 
rejection to pay 10,000,000 MUR (US$315,000) in compensation for Rodriguan fishers that 
were forced into early retirement. While the Mauritian Minister of Finance had urged the CC to 
withdraw his appeal, a decision on it was yet pending. This supported Clair’s argument that 
only the OPR was able to govern Rodrigues effectively, based on a professional relationship 
with Mauritius. 
 
However, things were to turn out differently. In their meeting after the demonstrations in the 
restaurant Chez Ram, ATR decided to use the now national attention given to Rodrigues and 
their cause to increase pressure on local authorities. Letters for all members of the RRA had 
already been drafted with the demand for a special meeting. It was on 22 June that the group     Trumping the Ethnic Card in Rodrigues 
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met again, just before their meeting with the CC, this time in the hotel Le Flamboyant. The 
RRA had decided to approach the Mauritian authorities one more time. The CC would send his 
Departmental  Head,  Pritam  S.  Mattan,  who  was  also  responsible  for  tourism  affairs,  to 
Mauritius. The ATR decided to field its own delegation to accompany him. 
 
Off to Mauritius 
 
I boarded the plane to Mauritius together with the ATR delegation on 5 July. It was the ATR 
72 to which the group makes reference in its name, the only domestic plane that flew on the 
trajectory between Mauritius and Rodrigues, operated exclusively by Air Mauritius. A press 
conference  was  scheduled  for  Monday  before  the  negotiation  with  the  government 
representative Ali Michael Mansoor, the Financial Advisor of Prime Minister Ramgoolam. It 
was him who had stopped the transaction of 10,000,000 MUR to Rodrigues to support the 
fishers’ early retirement. He had already worked for the World Bank and, according to the 
expectations of the ATR members, he would be difficult to deal with. 
 
The ATR delegation included Rommel Farla, who in his ordinary life drove a caterpillar and 
was the spokesperson for the Workers’ Union on Rodrigues. Other members of the group were 
Marie Louise Augustin Roussety, president of the Organisation Femmes Entrepreneurs, James 
Begué,  president  of  the  Rodrigues  Council  of  Social  Services,  McGill  Meunier,  a  tourism 
entrepreneur,  and  Jean  Pierre  Lim  Kin,  president  of  the  Association  Rodriguaise  pour  un 
Développement Touristique Intégré. He had his own business, JP Excursions, with which he 
organized sightseeing trips for hotel guests and as such had a direct interest in an increase in 
visitor numbers on Rodrigues. While for him it would not matter whether those were domestic 
or international tourists, this was different for another member of the group, Willy Auguste, 
owner of Hotel Mourouk. It was the international tourists who booked hotel rooms and less the 
Mauritians who came to Rodrigues to buy spicy piment paste and dried fish and octopus, and 
often did not stay in hotels but preferred cheaper, self-catered apartments. For Auguste, the 
current situation of the negotiations with the Mauritian authorities was worsened by the fact 
that the offer made by the government was tied to the demand that hotels owners on Rodrigues, 
like him, would need to agree to a 25% discount on their accommodation rates, exclusive to 
Mauritian visitors. This demand had already been passed on to ATR, but its members were 
forced to keep it confidential. In light of upcoming elections, the Mauritian government itself 
wished to break the news to its citizens after contracts were signed. 
 
During our stay on Mauritius we lived in Rose Hill, a city east of the capital Port Louis, in a 
guesthouse  called Sunshine  whose  apartments  were  mainly  used  by  regional  and domestic 
tourists from Rodrigues, Mauritius and the Seychelles. Two rooms in each apartment, each 
with a double bed, a large living and dining area, toilet and shower in separate rooms and a 
fully equipped kitchen for 300 MUR (about US$12) per person and night. The stay in shared 
budget apartments shows that the group came to Mauritius as visitors who had to pay for 
accommodation,  transport  and  food,  in  contrast  to  government  officials  like  Mattan,  who 
lodged in a hotel paid for by the Mauritian authorities. Staying in Rose Hill, a large and poor 
workers’ town about 20km from the capital, and even further away from the beautiful sandy 
beaches and tourist resorts, emphasized the commitment of the participants to their project but C. Wergin 
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also the difficulties they were faced with. It also hinted that, while hotel and restaurant owners 
on Rodrigues were in support of the ATR cause, this was obviously not the case on Mauritius. 
 
On the first day, Farla took me on a visit to his friend, a leading Syndicaliste who “had taught 
him everything”; how important it was to fight for one’s rights and to create a forum through 
the work of unions. We spoke about his family who in his eyes was “really mixed”. His father 
was French, his mother Malagasy. She always forbade him to play with whites because she 
would fear that they would seduce him to go to Europe, only to later kill him there. Twice, he 
had the chance to leave Rodrigues. One time, a French woman wanted to marry him. The other 
time, two French policemen saw him climb a steep ravine and wanted him to join the French 
mountaineers. But both times his mother said no. 
 
Farla was the only member of the group who talked about the particularities of Rodrigues with 
me. One example was a story related to the fruits he would eat as a child when his family had 
nothing else. In the 1960s there were still many fruit trees and also much rice cultivation on 
Rodrigues so that no one actually had to suffer from hunger. But according to him, the English 
cut  down  those  trees  to  make  Rodriguans  dependent  on  imports.  On  a  similar  note,  he 
explained that the concept of buying something was not well established at the time within the 
local population. This allowed for Mauritians to take advantage of exchanges like rice against 
fish, or money against precious land. However, today Rodriguans were, in his opinion, better 
equipped, intellectually and politically, as shown by the intervention of their Société Civil in 
the guise of ATR. 
 
Later that day, we met with Maxy André and Willy Auguste and spoke about the arrogance of 
the Rodriguan CC Johnson Roussety. With regards to the 10,000,000 MUR allocated to the 
fishers, he was to have said that this would make the Mauritian Prime Minister “drop his 
pants”. It was such rumours that had made it difficult for Maxy and Willy to further support his 
government. They wanted to end the legacy of Serge Clair when they voted for Roussety. Still 
they expected more of him. But instead of change, there was talk about corruption, and that the 
CC had lost his temper too many times and ruined the relations with the Mauritian authorities, 
including Xavier Duval, Minister for Tourism at the time, who was known to like Rodrigues 
and its people, and to have a special interest in helping them. 
 
According to Auguste, Duval would be happy to work more closely with tourism entrepreneurs 
from  the  island.  When  Ramgoolam  was  quoted  that  he  does  not  want  mass  tourism  on 
Rodrigues, this was apparently a statement made by Duval who knew about a possible sell-out 
of the island – of its most beautiful beaches and hotel spots to the highest bidder – under the 
Roussety government. Now the Mauritian government found itself in a similar position to these 
members of ATR. By supporting Roussety and his party, they wanted to oppose Clair who 
often blocked their promotion initiatives. But what they realized now was that Roussety was no 
better, in particular when for tourism promotion initiatives he sent his health secretary to South 
Africa to live in an expensive hotel; while Auguste, the tourism entrepreneur, joined him with 
one fourth of the budget available to him. 
 
This  was  the  political  and  social  backdrop  to  the  negotiations  that  would  take  place  on 
Mauritius the following day.     Trumping the Ethnic Card in Rodrigues 
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Negotiations: Trumping the Ethnic Card 
 
Ali  Michael  Mansoor  was  Financial  Advisor  to  Prime Minister  Ramgoolam.  According  to 
Farla’s friend, the Syndicaliste, he was the one with the real power in the country, with a 
monthly salary higher than that of Ramgoolam himself. He was a neoliberal businessman, and 
a key influence on the upcoming negotiations in which ATR was represented only by one of its 
members,  Aurele  André.  He  accompanied  Mattan,  the  Departmental  Head  of  Roussety, 
responsible for land rights and tourism development. According to André, the latter would 
have  accepted  the  initial  offer  of  6,000  tickets,  reduced  by  30%  from  the  standard  fare, 
combined with a 30% reduction on Rodriguan hotel fares exclusive to Mauritians. But André 
refused. The fight for cheaper airfares had turned into a fight for Rodriguan Creole equality. 
 
After the negotiations, André gave the following account of what had happened. When asked 
about  his  opinion  towards  subsidized  tickets  not  only  to  but  also  from  Rodrigues  to  the 
‘mother(is)land’, Mansoor was to have said “Rodriguans? What do we want those on Mauritius 
for?” and furthermore that one had “dropped some bread” for the Rodriguans and it should be 
picked up. Based on these statements ATR reinvoked the sentiment of a neglected Creole-
Rodriguan people, oppressed by Mauritian politics and interests. After the news of the verbal 
assaults by Mansoor was spread to the other members of ATR, the group discussed what to do 
next. Marie Louise Roussety was particularly enraged (“en colère”) after she was told about the 
incident. Old wounds became visible, and they were articulated. James Begué mentioned to me 
how he was treated in school. Every time he would have an answer to a question from the 
teacher, he would be called up with a particular voice: “Ahhh... le Rodriguais”. Willy Auguste 
and Marie Louise could still hear this demeaning manner in which teachers would pronounce 
“Rodriguais” in their ears. Auguste even knew how to imitate the slur. 
 
In a very short time, ATR generated a lot of support. Right after the negotiations, the group 
went to meet Father Jocelyn Grégoire, President of the Fédération Créole Mauritien (FCM), 
which he founded in 2007. In their meeting, he showed much understanding for the colère and 
promised to send a delegation to the press conference that was foreseen for the following day. 
From  Father  Grégoire  the  group  continued  for  a  meeting  with  the  former  President  of 
Mauritius Cassam Uteem (see Figure 1). He was now a consultant for and representative of 
various  national  and  international  institutions,  including  the  UN.  The  meeting  could  be 
arranged because Maxy André was a good friend of his late son. On the way, we heard on the 
radio that the unsuccessful negotiations were breaking news. We sat in his residence in a softly 
rosé room and spoke. Aurele André made every effort to explain the situation quietly and 
respectfully, even though he was obviously outraged and at the same time very thankful to be 
heard. Uteem was curious to know what I, as the only étranger, was doing in the group. He 
then gave André the advice to go public with Mansoor’s behaviour. 
 
The following day, ATR was invited to the headquarters of the opposition party Mouvement 
Militant  Mauritien  (MMM).  A  photo  was  taken  of  the  ATR  members  sitting  around  a 
negotiation  table  that  covered  the  front  page  of  the  10  July  2009  edition  of  their  party 
newspaper Le Militant. The situation had remained uncertain until that meeting. However, the 
Prime Minister had been heard on the radio saying with reference to the accusations made that 
a person who thought that the government has no consideration for Rodrigues “must be mad”. C. Wergin 
  128
They would be doing everything they could to help Rodrigues but they also needed to make 
sure that money was spent properly. 
 
Figure 1: The ATR delegation in front of Cassam Uteem’s residence: (from left to right) Maxy 
André, Willy Auguste,  James Begué, Aurele André, Cassam Uteem, Jean Pierre  Lim  Kin, 
Marie Louise Roussety, McGill Meunier, (the author), Rommel Farla. Photo: C. Wergin. 
 
 
 
The same day day, Pravind Kumar Jugnauth, the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance 
and Economic Development, personally called Aurele André, invited the Rodriguan delegation 
to continue negotiations, and promised that such an incident would not reoccur. In return, he 
demanded  from  ATR  to  publicly  emphasize  that  their  accusations  were  the  result  not  of 
disrespect but of a simple misunderstanding. Within two days of Ramgoolam’s statement, ATR 
returned to the negotiation table and a solution was found that was satisfying to all parties 
involved. 
 
Trouble in Paradise, Again 
 
What appeared to be a simple request for subsidized airfares turned into a considerable social, 
political and economic threat. When negotiations with government representatives ran the risk 
of failure, ATR ‘trumped the ethnic card’. Threatening to go public with their accusations 
against Financial Secretary Mansoor, ATR created significant pressure on their opponents. On 
the one hand, there was a risk that these might provoke uprisings of the Creole population. 
Memories of the violent civil unrest in 1999 after the mysterious death of the Creole Seggae 
singer Kaya remain fresh (Vellien, 1999). On the other hand, the negative publicity of ‘trouble 
in paradise’ could badly damage images of Mauritius as the ‘rainbow nation’ and a peaceful     Trumping the Ethnic Card in Rodrigues 
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‘multiethnic society’, both of which are important marketing devices for tourist promotion and 
foreign direct investment on Mauritius. 
 
The immanence of this threat was supported by fast information flows via informal networks, 
local media and the Internet. Facebook postings spread the word about conflict within minutes 
all over both islands. How individuals put related publicity manoeuvres into play becomes 
even more transparent and visible in a small island society. It was easy for me as an outsider to 
be  accepted  by  ATR  members  and  have  privy  to  some  (but  not  all)  dealings.  I  can  only 
speculate about why I was allowed to join them on their journey. One aspect might have been 
that, as researcher and academic, I was used as an apparently impartial witness to the events 
and negotiations that took place. Why they were so generous was related to their eagerness to 
share their version of the story and to have it documented. For that, they had found a good 
listener in me. The importance of this role became visible, for example, in the meeting with 
Cassam Uteem, despite  the fact that  I had no direct involvement in the actual negotiation 
process. 
 
Personally, I was grateful for the opportunity to travel with ATR. After all, to be accepted and 
trusted by members of a local community is what any anthropologist hopes for. In that respect, 
my version of the events is not impartial but influenced by my close relationship with the 
group.  Despite  this  admittedly  subjective  approach,  the  resulting  ethnography  allows  for 
further conclusions about the small island community of Mauritius and its political system.  
 
Ethnicity is a hot button topic and a political divisive one not only in Mauritius. Personal 
experiences and memories of segregation and mistreatment continue to inform perceptions and 
decisions. It is not surprising then that for some members of the delegation to Mauritius, it was 
a special experience to be part of ATR. They were working together strategically, driven by 
their  interests  as  entrepreneurs  but  also  by  the  group  spirit  and  the  united  cause  ATR 
represented, namely to defend Creole rights. Farla could not stop repeating how important it 
had been for him that they were there as one block and one voice; a large group that made a 
large  impact  on  the  people  they  were  arguing  with;  the  Mauritian  tourism  authority,  Air 
Mauritius and government representatives. To my knowledge, no attempts were made to break 
this alliance, for example by the Mauritian government buying off one or two of its supporters. 
Even if such attempts were made, they did not succeed. 
 
Other members of the group were less emotionally attached to the platform but acted more 
strategically. It was thanks to the many contacts of people like Maxy André that, after the 
initial unsuccessful negotiations, a large platform could be united, a platform of other Creole 
minorities, including Chagossians and FCM, of Syndicalists, and political parties. While in 
parts clumsy and even condescending, this platform showed that their ethnicity could provide 
leverage.  It  guaranteed  significant pressure on the Mauritian authorities, who consequently 
needed to demonstrate more willingness to help the Rodriguan tourism sector. The government 
noted the possible danger of a nationwide outcry for Creole rights. After the failure of the first 
negotiations  became  public,  numerous  people  began  to  proclaim  the  possibility  of  larger 
demonstrations. A country like Mauritius, that has an international reputation to lose in front of 
the eyes of UN, EU, industrial investors, and tourists, including attendants of the FIFA 2010 C. Wergin 
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World Cup in South Africa, who had become an important marketing target, could simply not 
allow this to happen. 
 
The impact of the agreement between ATR and the Mauritian authorities on the Rodriguan 
tourism sector is outlined in Table 1. Visitor numbers had been rising until 2007, a time when 
tourism was thought to become an even stronger economic player, and saw the opening of a 
new hotel on the island. Then, arrivals dropped significantly in 2008, the year of the global 
financial crisis. The program launched by ATR and the government helped stabilize arrival 
figures in 2009 (and 2010); a promotional offer that ran between August 2009 and December 
2010 saw a reduction on airfares from 8,000 MUR (US$320) to 5,430 MUR (US$217), plus a 
30% discount on accommodation for a minimum stay of four nights on the island. 
 
Discussion 
 
Official  data  to  support  the  claims  made  by  interviewees  is  limited  to  a  few  Mauritian 
newspaper articles. On 9 July 2009, L’Express printed a statement by Ramgoolam in which he 
emphasized that anyone who would think the Mauritian government would neglect Rodrigues 
would have “a serious problem”. In an editorial of the same issue, the discussions between the 
Mauritian authorities, represented by Mansoor, and ATR were reviewed, suggesting that the 
problem was that “one does not understand the other”. The government wanted to support the 
Rodriguan tourism sector while ATR aimed to bring the populations of the two islands closer 
together. While the former presented an economic problem, the latter’s position was a largely 
political one. The above was a response to another article, printed in L’Express the day before, 
whose headline quoted Aurele André saying, “Financial Secretary Ali Mansoor has no heart.” 
It outlined the negotiations that took place, reasons for their failure, and concluded with the 
announcement of a press conference held by ATR the following day, emphasizing that the 
issue might be taken to the streets of Port Louis where it would result in larger demonstrations. 
 
Apart from the Mauritian papers, there are three local newspapers on Rodrigues. All of them 
covered the developments before and during the negotiation process. However, members of the 
MR own two of these papers and Serge Clair, leader of the OPR, founded the other. While all 
three claim journalistic integrity, their style of writing and argumentation (apart from the sports 
news) is often, if not always, aimed at discrediting the other party. 
 
In  relation  to  this,  the  main  reason  for  me  to  keep  the  partly  anecdotal  character  of  the 
ethnographic description intact has been that it is the particular form of talking, of making 
claims, of gossiping and pretending to know more than the other about someone, their interests 
and whereabouts that strongly influences everyday action and political debate on Rodrigues. 
This la di la fé that is also common on Mauritius and Réunion Island (Wergin, 2010) – and I 
would argue in many other small island territories around the world – can bring about the fall 
of a regional politician and the rise of another. It is therefore not so much a question of whether 
claims are true or false, fact or fiction, but whether enough people believe in them. 
 
While it has not been possible to ‘solve’ the financial crisis of the Rodriguan tourism sector by 
pressuring the Mauritian government, this case study of island-mainland politics in federated 
systems demonstrates how sensitive a small island state can be to an image of itself that serves     Trumping the Ethnic Card in Rodrigues 
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as  the  basis  for  a  whole  industry  and  economy.  One  cannot  advertise  Mauritius  if  its 
government is said to undermine the rights of significant sections of its population. This and 
possible riots would cause tremendous damage to the aforementioned tourism imaginary of a 
peaceful,  multiethnic  ‘rainbow  nation’  so  carefully  crafted  in  over  40  years  of  promotion 
activity. The case of Rodrigues shows how such tourism imaginaries, like the ‘island paradise’ 
that  Mauritius  is  thought  and  marketed  to  be,  need  to  be  understood  as  complex  sites  of 
negotiation  and  contestation  that  demand  careful  diplomacy.  Parallel  examples  are  efforts 
made to redraft the imaginaries of Bali or Thailand as beautiful and apparently safe havens for 
tourism after what has become known as the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, and the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of 2004. 
 
While ethnicity has been identified as a central commodity within tourist promotion (Comaroff 
& Comaroff, 2009), imaginaries about ethnicity and peaceful ‘multiethnic’ togetherness are 
often far from the political and social realities of a place. Since members of ATR to a large 
extent  represent  the  local  business  elite,  their  claims  have  great  relevance;  they  are  more 
widely heard and recognized than those of many other members of Rodriguan society. Their 
different enterprises are heavily dependent on tourism and as such they account for some of the 
main beneficiaries of their initiative themselves. The intervention of this local entrepreneurial 
elite in the decision-making process, and in regional politics in general, presents a new layer of 
accessibility to authorities, to power and political decision making beyond democratic means. 
 
At the same time, the economic value that such imaginaries have for a tourist destination might 
stop a government from running certain risks, such as those associated with a public display of 
ethnic conflict, or whatever else might endanger the good standing and thus the open economy 
of the country. It appears that a growing Creole elite in Mauritius is well aware of its latent 
powers in this regard, and of the threats it can induce if it is to act as a unified opposition to its 
government. The 2008 UNESCO World Heritage listing of the Mauritian mountain Le Morne 
indicates further steps in the mainstreaming of Creole history in Mauritius: slaves throughout 
the 18th and early 19th century used this space as a hideout (UNESCO, 2012). It remains 
however to be seen if and how this largely ‘negative heritage’ of a neglected minority can be 
included in a more encompassing tourism imaginary for Mauritius. 
 
Too many social and political factors played into the hands of the ATR negotiators. But the 
actual danger for Rodriguan development was not Mauritius, or an apparent reticence of the 
‘mother(is)land’ to help. It was a Rodriguan society unable to produce political leadership that 
could work as a trustworthy partner in negotiations. The people that sponsored the political 
change in 2006 were the same entrepreneurs that now fought for help. Many of those who 
supported the MR back then only did so because the party seemed to offer a space for free 
expression,  without judgement  by  an  omnipresent  leader.  Most  of  them  were  interested  in 
better living conditions, which for them were directly connected to economic well-being. What 
has become evident here is that both regional parties on Rodrigues, MR and OPR, need to take 
steps on how to incorporate a Société Civil into their political programs. OPR, especially its 
leader,  has  always  considered  itself  to  be  the  spokesperson  for  all  Rodriguans.  But  many 
people on Rodrigues have by now enjoyed a level of education that allows them to speak for 
themselves, form their own opinions, and set up their own interest groups. They no longer 
simply listen to political leadership but know how to take action. C. Wergin 
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Conclusion 
 
Based on an ethnographic study of the tensions between local and national decision makers, 
tourism entrepreneurs and politicians, this article has discussed how notions of ethnicity in 
conjunction with the 2008 global financial crisis can be put to creative use. In the case of 
Rodrigues  Island’s  ATR  versus  the  Mauritian  authorities,  the  crisis  reached  well  beyond 
economic development issues, right to the heart of an age-old ethnic conflict: the Malaise 
Créole within Mauritian society. Central to the analysis presented were the points of view of 
people  directly  engaged  in  and  affected  by  political  decision-making  processes,  ethnic 
difference and the global economic downturn. The article has presented the positive impacts of 
these  people’s  innovative  responses  to  this  ‘double-crisis’,  i.e.  the  development  of  new 
partnerships and collaborations, corporate social responsibility, and pointed at their creative 
use of information technologies and social media such as Facebook, all of which might lead to 
a more inclusive concept of a ‘multiethnic Mauritian society’.
  
 
Tsing has criticized the imagery set up by globalization discourse and strategy at some length. 
She has shown that culture and politics of scale making are at the route of ideologies, wishes 
and  fantasies  about  global  economic  interconnectivity,  as  well  as  political  and  social 
networking (Tsing, 2000). In contrast to ethnographic approaches that follow these forms of 
understanding and theorize the global as something complex but inevitable (Urry 2005), she 
has argued that “we need to study how scales, geographies, eras, and other imaginative terrains 
are differentially and dialogically negotiated, refused, or erased” (Tsing, 2000: 345). 
 
It  has  been  argued  that  tourism  enlarges  and  transnationalizes  the  social  spaces  of  host 
communities.  When  introduced  as  a  new  system  of  production  and  exchange,  it  modifies 
institutional  frameworks.  Within  this  new  context  of  consumer-led  economies,  production 
becomes geared to the symbolic and aesthetic. Formerly irrelevant community practices can 
become relevant in this process, elevated to the status of symbolic resources that are mobilized 
to define and delimit local identity (Robinson & Picard, 2006; Lash & Urry, 1994).  
 
There is however a need to go beyond this understanding of symbolism and aesthetics that 
focuses on tourism as a globalist concept; a touristification of the world. As an attempt to 
include  the  mobilization  of  people  into  the  ideologies  surrounding  tourism,  I  have  traced 
ATR’s project as a particular historical event and followed its movements from demonstrations 
on Rodrigues to the negotiation table of the Mauritian government, via the rosé room of the 
house  of  a  former  President  and  the  radio  stations  of  the  nation.  This  entangles  the  ATR 
initiative  with  local  issues  of  translation  and  mobilization.  It  also  moves  the  ethnographic 
discussion “into those cracks most neglected by unselfconscious reliance on global futurism, 
globalist  conflation,  and  global  circulation”  (Tsing,  2000:  347).  The  concreteness  of  the 
ethnographic account connects mobility and mobilization; identities and interests are formed 
and  travel  as  “place-transcending  interactions”  with  open  outcomes  (ibid.:  350).  The  close 
reading  of  ATR’s  project  changes  the  geographical  and  political  perception  of  Mauritius, 
beyond  its  globalist  self-understanding  as  a  ‘rainbow  nation’.  It  proves  to  be  a  concrete 
historical episode with arguable repercussions in the future. 
     Trumping the Ethnic Card in Rodrigues 
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On 5 February 2012, the Organisation Du People Rodriguais under the leadership of Serge 
Clair won the regional elections on Rodrigues and regained its leading political power on the 
island. This change has been foreshadowed by the events described above. It presents a new 
attempt of the Rodriguan people to establish a qualified political leadership that will work in 
their interests. Yet, this new attempt puts old political actors back into power so it remains to 
be seen whether OPR and its leader will acknowledge what their Société Civil is capable of and 
approach it differently from before. 
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